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Consider the problem of allocating objects to agents and how much they should pay.
Each agent has a preference relation over pairs of a set of objects and a payment. Prefer-
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1 Introduction
Consider an object assignment model with money. Each agent receives a set of objects, pays
money, and has a preference relation over a set of objects and a payment. An allocation
species how the objects are allocated to the agents and how much they pay. An (allocation)
rule is a mapping from the class of admissible preference proles, which we call \domain,"
to the set of allocations. An allocation is ecient if without reducing the total payment,
no other allocation makes all agents at least as well o and at least one agent better o. A
rule is ecient if it always selects an ecient allocation. Strategy-proofness is a condition
of incentive compatibility. It requires that each agent should have an incentive to report his
true preferences. This paper is to investigate the possibility of designing ecient and strategy-
proofness rules.
Our model can be treated as one of the multi-object auction models. Much literature on
auction theory makes an assumption on preferences, \quasi-linearity." It states that valua-
tions over objects are not aected by payment level. On the quasi-linear domain, i.e., the
class of quasi-linear preferences, rules so-called \VCG rules" (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971;
Groves, 1973) satisfy eciency and strategy-proofness, and they are only rules satisfying those
properties (Holmstom, 1979).
As Marshall (1920) demonstrates, preferences are approximately quasi-linear if payments
for goods are suciently low. However, in important applications of auction theory such as
spectrum license allocations, house allocations, etc., prices are often equal to or exceed agents'
annual revenues. Excessive payments for the objects may damage agents' budgets to purchase
complements for eective uses of the objects, and thus may inuence the benets from the
objects. Or agents may need to obtain loans to pay high amounts, and typically nancial costs
are nonlinear in borrowings. This factor also makes agents' preferences non-quasi-linear.1 In
such important applications, quasi-linearity is not a suitable assumption.2
Some authors studying object assignment problems do not assume quasi-linearity but make
a dierent assumption on preferences, \single demand" property.3 It states that an agent
wishes to receive at most one object. On the single demand domain, i.e., the class of single
demand preferences, it is known that the minimum price Walrasian rules are well-dened.4 The
minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rules are rules that assign an allocation associated with the
minimum price Walrasian equilibria for each preference prole. Demange and Gale (1985) show
that the MPW rules are strategy-proof on the single demand domain. It is straightforward
that in addition to eciency, the MPW rules satisfy two properties on this domain: individual
rationality ; no subsidy for losers. Individual rationality states that the bundle assigned to an
agent is at least as good as getting no object and paying zero. No subsidy for losers states that
the payment of an agent who receives no object is nonnegative. Morimoto and Serizawa (2015)
show that on the single demand domain, the MPW rules are only rules satisfying eciency,
strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers.
1 See Saitoh and Serizawa (2008) for numerical examples.
2 Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) also discuss the importance of the analysis under non-quasi-linear preferences.
Also see Sakai (2008) and Baisa (2013) for more examples of non-quasi-linear preferences.
3 For example, see Andersson and Svensson (2014), Andersson et al. (2015), and Tierney (2015).
4 Precisely, if agents have unit demand preferences, minimum price Walrasian equilibria exist. See Quinzi
(1984), Gale (1984), and Alkan and Gale (1990).
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Although the assumption of the single demand property is suitable for some important
cases such as house allocation, etc., the number of such applications is limited. In many cases,
there are agents who wish to receive more than one object, and indeed, many authors analyze
such cases.5
Now, one natural question arises. Is it possible to design ecient and strategy-proof rules
on a domain which is not the quasi-linear domain or the single demand domain? This is the
question we address in this paper. To state our result precisely, we dene a property, which we
call the \multi demand"property. A preference relation satises the multi demand property
if when an agent receives an object, an additional object makes him better o. We start
from the single demand domain, and expand the domain by adding multi demand preferences.
We show that on any domain that includes the single demand domain and contains at least
one multi demand preference relation, no rule satises eciency, strategy-proofness, individual
rationality, and no subsidy for losers.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model and basic deni-
tions. In Section 3, we dene the minimum price Walrasian rule. In Section 4, we state our
result and show the proof. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model and denitions
Consider an economy where there are n  2 agents and m  2 indivisible objects. We denote
the set of agents by N  f1; : : : ; ng and the set of objects by M  f1; : : : ;mg. Let M
be the power set of M . For each a 2 M , with abuse of notation, we sometimes write a to
denote fag. Each agent receives a subset of M and pays some amount of money. Thus, the
consumption set is MR and a generic (consumption) bundle of agent i is denoted by
zi = (Ai; ti) 2M R. Let 0  (;; 0).
Each agent i has a complete and transitive preference relation Ri over M R. Let Pi
and Ii be the strict and indierent relations associated with Ri. A set of preferences is called
a domain and a generic domain is denoted by R.6 The following are basic properties of
preferences.
Money monotonicity: For each Ai 2M and each ti; t0i 2 R with ti < t0i, (Ai; ti) Pi (Ai; t0i).
Possibility of compensation: For each (Ai; ti) 2 M  R and each A0i 2 M, there are
t0i; t
00
i 2 R such that (Ai; ti) Ri (A0i; t0i) and (A0i; t00i ) Ri (Ai; ti).
Continuity: For each zi 2 M R, the upper contour set at zi, UCi(zi)  fz0i 2 M R :
z0i Ri zig, and the lower contour set at zi, LCi(zi)  fz0i 2 M  R : zi Ri z0ig, are both
closed.
Desirability of object: (i) For each (a; ti) 2 M  R, (a; ti) Pi (;; ti), and (ii) for each
(Ai; ti) 2M R and each A0i 2M with A0i  Ai, (Ai; ti) Ri (A0i; ti).7
5 For example, see Gul and Stacchetti (1999, 2000), Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002), Papai (2003), Ausubel
(2004, 2006), Mishra and Parkes (2007), de Vries et al (2007), and Sun and Yang (2006, 2009, 2014).
6 Formally, the domain of an allocation rule is a set of preference proles. In this article, however, we simply
call a set of preferences a domain, because we dene rules on a Cartesian product of the same set of preferences.
7 Condition (ii) requires free disposal. Morimoto and Serizawa (2015) also dene desirability of object but
require only condition (i), because in their model it is assumed that each agent can receive at most one object.
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Denition 1 A preference relation is classical if it satises money monotonicity, possibility
of compensation, continuity, and desirability of object.8
Let RC be the class of classical preferences, and we call it the classical domain. Through-
out this paper, we assume that preferences are classical.
Note that by money monotonicity, possibility of compensation and continuity, for each
Ri 2 RC , each zi 2 M R, and each Ai 2 M, there is a unique payment, CVi(Ai; zi) 2 R,
such that (Ai; CVi(Ai; zi)) Ii zi. We call this payment the compensated valuation of Ai from
zi for Ri. Note that by money monotonicity, for each (Ai; ti); (A
0
i; t
0
i) 2MR, (Ai; ti) Ri (A0i; t0i)
if and only if CVi(A
0
i; (Ai; ti))  t0i.
Denition 2 A preference relation Ri 2 RC is quasi-linear if for each (Ai; ti); (A0i; t0i) 2
M R and each t00i 2 R, (Ai; ti) Ii (A0i; t0i) implies (Ai; ti + t00i ) Ii (A0i; t0i + t00i ).
Let RQ be the class of quasi-linear preferences, and we call it the quasi-linear domain.
Obviously, RQ ( RC .
Remark 1 Let Ri 2 RQ. Then,
(i) there is a valuation function vi :M! R+ such that vi(;) = 0, and for each (Ai; ti); (A0i; t0i) 2
M R, (Ai; ti) Ri (A0i; t0i) if and only if vi(A0i)  t0i  vi(Ai)  ti, and
(ii) for each (Ai; ti) 2M R and each A0i 2M, CVi(A0i; (Ai; ti))  ti = vi(A0i)  vi(Ai).
Now we dene important classes of preferences. The following denition captures prefer-
ences of agents who desire to consume only one object.
Denition 3 A preference relation Ri 2 RC satises the single demand property if
(i) for each (a; ti) 2M R, (a; ti) Pi (;; ti), and
(ii) for each (Ai; ti) 2M R with jAij > 1, there is a 2 Ai such that (Ai; ti) Ii (a; ti).9
Condition (i) says that an agent prefers any object to no object. Condition (ii) says that
if an agent receives a set consisting of several objects, there is an object in the set that makes
him indierent to the set. Let RU be the class of single demand preferences and we call it the
single demand domain. Obviously, RU ( RC .
Note that the single demand property is equivalent to the following:
(i0) for each a 2M and each ti 2 R, CVi(a; (;; ti)) > ti, and
(ii0) for each Ai 2M and each ti 2 R, CVi(Ai; (;; ti)) = maxa2Ai CVi(a; (;; ti)).10
Figure 1 illustrates a single demand preference relation.
***** FIGURE 1 (Single demand preference relation) ENTERS HERE *****
We also consider preferences of agents who desire to consume more than one object. The
following denition captures preferences of agents who desire to consume until a xed number
of objects.
8 Morimoto and Serizawa (2015) also dene classical preferences as a preferences satisfying the same prop-
erties that we impose. However, because of condition (ii) of desirability of object, their denition is slightly
dierent from ours.
9 Given a set X, jXj denotes the cardinality of X.
10 Gul and Stacchetti (1999) dene the single demand property for quasi-linear preferences. However they do
not require condition (i0). In their model, a preference relation Ri 2 RQ satises the single demand property
if for each Ai 2M n f;g, vi(Ai) = maxa2Ai vi(a). This condition corresponds to condition (ii0).
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Denition 4 Let k 2 f2 : : : ;mg. A preference relation Ri 2 RC satises the k objects
demand property if
(i) for each (Ai; ti) 2MR with jAij < k, and each a 2MnAi, (Ai [ fag; ti) Pi (Ai; ti), and
(ii) for each (Ai; ti) 2 M  R with jAij  k, there is A0i  Ai with jA0ij  k such that
(Ai; ti) Ii (A
0
i; ti).
11
Condition (i) says that an agent prefers an additional object until he gets k objects. Con-
dition (ii) says that if an agent receives a set consisting of at least k objects, there is a subset
consisting of at most k objects that makes him indierent to the original set.
The k objects demand property is equivalent to the following:
(i0) for each Ai 2M with jAij < k, each a 2MnAi, and each ti 2 R, CVi(Ai [ fag; (;; ti)) >
CVi(Ai; (;; ti)), and
(ii0) for eachAi 2M with jAij  k and each ti 2 R, CVi(Ai; (;; ti)) = maxA0iAi;jA0ijk CVi(A0i; (;; ti)).
Figure 2 illustrates a k objects demand preference relation, when k = 2.
***** FIGURE 2 (2 objects demand preference relation) ENTERS HERE *****
The following class of preferences is larger than the classes of k-objects demand preferences.
The denition requires only that when an agent receives an object, an additional one make
him better o.
Denition 5 A preference relation Ri 2 RC satises the multi demand property if for each
(a; ti) 2M R and each Ai 2M with Ai ) fag, (Ai; ti) Pi (a; ti) Pi (;; ti).
Let RM be the class of preferences satisfying the multi demand property and call it the
multi demand domain. Note that for each k 2 f2; : : : ;mg, preferences satisfying the
k objects demand property satisfy the multi demand property. But there are multi demand
preferences that do not satisfy the k objects demand property for any k 2 f2; : : : ;mg (See
Figure 3). Note also that no multi demand preference relation satises the single demand
property, i.e., RM \RU = ;.
The multi demand property is equivalent to the following: for each a 2 M , each Ai 2 M
with Ai ) fag, and each ti 2 R, CVi(Ai; (;; ti)) > CVi(a; (;; ti)) > ti. Figure 3 illustrates
a multi demand preference relation. Note that this preference relation does not satisfy the
k objects demand property for any k 2 f2; : : : ;mg.
***** FIGURE 3 (Multi demand but not k demand preference relation) ENTERS HERE
*****
An object allocation is an n-tuple A  (A1;    ; An) 2Mn such that Ai\Aj = ; for each
i; j 2 N with i 6= j. We denote the set of object allocations by A. A (feasible) allocation is
an n-tuple z  (z1; : : : ; zn)  ((A1; t1); : : : ; (An; tn)) 2 (M R)n such that (A1; : : : ; An) 2 A.
We denote the set of feasible allocations by Z. Given z 2 Z, we denote the object allocation
and the agents' payments at z by A  (A1; : : : ; An) and t  (t1 : : : ; tn), respectively.
A preference prole is an n-tuple R  (R1;   Rn) 2 Rn. Given R 2 Rn and i 2 N , let
R i  (Rj)j 6=i.
11 In Gul and Stacchetti (1999), this notion is called k satiation.
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An allocation rule, or simply a rule on Rn is a function f : Rn ! Z. Given a rule f and
R 2 Rn, we denote the bundle assigned to agent i by fi(R) and we write fi(R) = (Ai(R); ti(R)).
Now, we introduce standard properties of rules. The rst property states that for each
preference prole, a rule chooses an ecient allocation. An allocation z  ((Ai; ti))i2N 2 Z
is (Pareto-)ecient for R 2 Rn if there is no feasible allocation z0  ((A0i; t0i))i2N 2 Z such
that
(i) for each i 2 N; z0i Ri zi, (ii) for some j 2 N; z0j Pi zj; and (iii)
P
i2N t
0
i 
P
i2N ti.
Remark 2 By money monotonicity and continuity, eciency is equivalent to the condition
that there is no feasible allocation z0  ((A0i; t0i))i2N 2 Z such that
(i0) for each i 2 N , z0i Ii zi, and (ii0)
P
i2N t
0
i >
P
i2N ti.
Eciency: For each R 2 Rn, f(R) is ecient for R.
The second property states that no agent benets from misrepresenting his preferences.
Strategy-proofness: For each R 2 Rn, each i 2 N , and each R0i 2 R, fi(R)Ri fi(R0i; R i).
The third property states that an agent is never assigned a bundle that makes him worse
o than he would be if he had received no object and paid nothing.
Individual rationality: For each R 2 Rn and each i 2 N , fi(R) Ri 0.
The fourth property states that the payment of each agent is always nonnegative.
No subsidy: For each R 2 Rn and each i 2 N , ti(R)  0.
The nal property is a weaker variant of the fourth: if an agent receives no object, his
payment is nonnegative.
No subsidy for losers: For each R 2 Rn and each i 2 N , if Ai(R) = ;, ti(R)  0.
3 Minimum price Walrasian rule
In this section we dene the minimum price Walrasian rules and state several facts related to
them.
Let p  (p1; : : : ; pm) 2 Rm+ be a price vector. The budget set at p is dened as B(p) 
f(Ai; ti) 2 M R : ti =
P
a2Ai p
ag. Given Ri 2 R, the demand set at p for Ri is dened as
D(Ri; p)  fzi 2 B(p) : for each z0i 2 B(p); zi Ri z0ig.
Remark 3 For each Ri 2 RU , each p 2 Rm++, and each (Ai; ti) 2 D(Ri; p), jAij  1.
Denition 6 Let R 2 Rn. A pair ((A; t); p) 2 Z Rm+ is a Walrasian equilibrium for R if
(WE-i) for each i 2 N , (Ai; ti) 2 D(Ri; p); and
(WE-ii) for each y 2M; if a =2 Ai for each i 2 N; then, pa = 0:
Condition (WE-i) says that each agent receives a bundle that he demands. Condition (WE-
ii) says that an object's price is zero if it is not assigned to anyone. Given R 2 Rn, let W (R)
and P (R) be the sets of Walrasian equilibria and prices for R, respectively.
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Remark 4 Let R 2 (RU)n and p 2 P (R). If n > m, then pa > 0 for each a 2M .
The facts below are results for models in which each agent can receive at most one object.
On the other hand, each agent can receive several objects in our model. By condition (ii) of
the single demand property, however, the same results hold for single demand preferences.
Fact 1 For each R 2 (RU)n, a Walrasian equilibrium for R exists.
Fact 1 is shown by several authors.12 Fact 2 below states that for each preference prole,
there is a unique minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
Fact 2 (Demange and Gale, 1985) For each R 2 (RU)n, there is a unique p 2 P (R) such
that for each p0 2 P (R), p  p0.13
Let pmin(R) denote this price vector for R. A minimum price Walrasian equilibrium
(MPWE) is a Walrasian equilibrium associated with the minimum price. Although there
might be several minimum price Walrasian equilibria, they are indierent for each agent, i.e.,
for each R 2 Rn, each pair (z; pmin(R)); (z0; pmin(R)) 2 W (R), and each i 2 N , zi Ii z0i.
Denition 7 A rule f on Rn is a minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule if for each
R 2 Rn, (f(R); pmin(R)) 2 W (R).
The fact below states that on the single demand domain, the minimum price Walrasian
rules satisfy the properties stated in the fact, and that if there are more agents than objects,
they are the unique rules satisfying them.
Fact 3 (Demange and Gale, 1985; Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015) (i) The minimum
price Walrasian rules on (RU)n satisfy eciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and
no subsidy. (ii) Let n > m. Then, the minimum price Walrasian rules are the only rules on
(RU)n satisfying eciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy for losers.
4 Main result
We extend domains from the single demand domain by adding multi demand preferences and
investigate whether ecient and strategy-proof rules still exist on such domains. In marked
contrast to Fact 3 in Section 3, the results on expanded domains are negative. Namely, if there
are more agents than objects, and the domain includes the single demand domain and contains
at least one multi demand preference relation, then there exits no rule satisfying eciency,
strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy for losers.
Theorem Let n > m. Let R0 2 RM and R be such that R  RU [ fR0g. Then, no rule on
Rn satises eciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy for losers.
12 See, for example, Quinzi (1984), Gale (1984), and Alkan and Gale (1990).
13 For each p; p0 2 Rm, p  p0 if and only if for each i 2 f1; : : : ;mg, pi  p0i.
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Remark 5 In this paper, we assume that all the agents have the common domain R. If each
agent i 2 N has his own domain Ri, Theorem can be strengthen as follows. Suppose Ri  RU
for each i 2 N , and there is j 2 N and Rj 2 RM such that Rj 2 Rj. Then, there is no rule
on
Q
i2N Ri satisfying eciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality and no subsidy for
losers.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that there is a rule f on Rn satisfying the four properties.
Part I. We state six lemmas that are used in the proof. Lemma 1 below states that if an
agent receives no object, then his payment is zero. This is immediate from individual rationality
and no subsidy for losers. Thus we omit the proof.
Lemma 1 (Zero payment for losers) Let R 2 Rn and i 2 N . If Ai(R) = ;, ti(R) = 0.
Lemma 2 below states that all objects are always assigned. This follows from eciency,
n > m, and desirability of objects. We omit the proof.
Lemma 2 (Full object assignment) For each R 2 Rn and each a 2 M , there is i 2 N
such that a 2 Ai(R).
Lemma 3 below states that if an agent has a single demand preference relation, then he does
not receive more than one object. This follows from eciency, the single demand property,
and n > m. We omit the proof.
Lemma 3 (Single object assignment) Let R 2 Rn and i 2 N . If Ri 2 RU , jAi(R)j  1.
Lemma 4 below is a necessary condition for eciency.
Lemma 4 (Necessary condition for eciency) Let R 2 Rn and i; j 2 N with i 6= j. Let
Ai; Aj 2 A be such that Ai \ Aj = ; and Ai [ Aj  Ai(R) [ Aj(R). Then, CVi(Ai; fi(R)) +
CVj(Aj; fj(R))  ti(R) + tj(R).
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that CVi(Ai; fi(R))+CVj(Aj; fj(R)) > ti(R)+tj(R). Let z
0 2
Z be such that z0i = (Ai; CVi(Ai; fi(R))), z0j = (Aj; CVj(Aj; fj(R))), and for each k 2 N nfi; jg,
z0k = fk(R). Then z
0
k Ik fk(R) for each k 2 N . Moreover, CVi(Ai; fi(R)) + CVj(Aj; fj(R)) +P
k 6=i;j tk(R) >
P
k2N tk(R). By Remark 2, this is a contradiction to eciency. 2
By Lemma 1, Lemma 4 and n > m, we can show that f satises no subsidy.
Lemma 5 (No subsidy) For each Ri 2 Rn and each i 2 N , ti(R)  0.
Proof: (Figure 4.) Suppose by contradiction that ti(R) < 0 for some R 2 Rn and i 2 N . Let
R0i 2 RU \RQ be such that for each a 2M , v0i(a) < minj2N CVj(a;0). Note that by R0i 2 RU
and desirability of object, for each Ai 2M n f;g, v0i(Ai) < minj2N CVj(Ai;0).
First, suppose Ai(R
0
i; R i) = ;. By Lemma 1, ti(R0i; R i) = 0. By v0i(Ai(R)) > 0 > ti(R),
fi(R) = (Ai(R); ti(R)) P
0
i (Ai(R); v
0
i(Ai(R))) I
0
i 0 = fi(R
0
i; R i):
This is a contradiction to strategy-proofness. Hence, Ai(R
0
i; R i) 6= ;.
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By n > m and Ai(R
0
i; R i) 6= ;, there is j 2 N n fig such that Aj(R0i; R i) = ;. By
Lemma 1, fj(R
0
i; R i) = 0. Let Ai  ; and Aj  Ai(R0i; R i). Then, Ai \ Aj = ; and
Ai [ Aj  Ai(R0i; R i) [ Aj(R0i; R i). Moreover,
CV 0i (Ai; fi(R
0
i; R i)) + CVj(Aj; fj(R
0
i; R i))
= CV 0i (;; fi(R0i; R i)) + CVj(Ai(R0i; R i);0) (by fj(R0i; R i) = 0)
> CV 0i (;; fi(R0i; R i)) + v0i(Ai(R0i; R i) (by the def. of R0i)
= CV 0i (;; fi(R0i; R i)) + ti(R0i; R i)  CV 0i (;; fi(R0i; R i)) (by Remark 1 (ii))
= ti(R
0
i; R i)
= ti(R
0
i; R i) + tj(R
0
i; R i): (by tj(R
0
i; R i) = 0)
This is a contradiction to Lemma 4. 2
***** FIGURE 4 (Illustration of proof of Lemma 5)) ENTERS HERE *****
Lemma 6 below states that f coincides with an MPW rule on (RU)n. This is immediate
from Fact 3 (ii). Thus we omit the proof.
Lemma 6 For each R 2 (RU)n, (f(R); pmin(R)) 2 W (R).
Part II. The proof of Theorem has ve steps.
Step 1: Constructing a preference prole.
Let R1  R0, and
t1  maxft1   CV1(;; (A1; t1)) : (A1; t1) 2M R; (A1; t1) R1 0; t1  0g; and
t1  minfCV1(A1; (a; t1))  t1 : (a; t1) 2M R; (a; t1) R1 0; t1  0; A1 ) fagg:
Note that t1 and t1 are well-dened and t1 > t1.
14,15 Since R1 satises the multi demand
property, we have t1 > 0. Let a
 2 M be such that for each a 2 M , (a; t1) R1 (a; t1). By
desirability of object and money monotonicity, there is t1 2 (0; t1) such that (a; t1) P1 0. By
money monotonicity, for each a 2 M n fag, CV1(a; (a; t1)) < CV1(a; (a; t1))  t1. We may
assume a = 1 since the other cases can be treated in the same way. Let p 2 Rm++ be such that
p1 = t1, and for each a 2 M n f1g, maxfCV1(a; (1; p1)); 0g < pa < t1. Figure 5 illustrates R1
and p.
14 By money monotonicity and possibility of compensation, the sets ft1   CV1(;; (A1; t1)) : (A1; t1) 2
M R; (A1; t1) R1 0; t1  0g and fCV1(A1; (a; t1))   t1 : (a; t1) 2 M R; (a; t1) R1 0; t1  0; A1 ) fagg are
bounded. By continuity of R1, compensated valuation is a continuous function, and thus, we can show that
the two sets are closed.
15 Let (a; t1) 2 M R be such that (a; t1) R1 0 and t1  0. Let A1 ) fag and t01  CV1(A1; (a; t1)). Then,
(A1; t
0
1) I1 (a; t1) R1 0. By desirability of object, t
0
1 = CV1(A1; (a; t1))  t1  0. Thus, (A1; t01) 2 f(A001 ; t001) 2
M R : (A001 ; t001) R1 0; t001  0g. Therefore, t01   CV1(;; (A1; t1))  t1.
Note that by desirability of object, CV1(;; (A1; t01)) = CV1(;; (a; t1)) < t1. Thus,
t1  CV1(A1; (a; t1))  t1 = t01   t1 < t01   CV1(;; (A1; t01))  t1:
9
***** FIGURE 5 (R1 and p) ENTERS HERE ******
Let R2 2 RU satisfy the following conditions:
(2  1) CV2(a;0)
8><>:
> t1 if a = 1;
2 (p2; t1) if a = 2;
< pa otherwise;
(2  2) for each a 2M n f2g; CV2(a; (2; p2)) < 0; and
(2  3) CV2(;; (2; 0)) > max
a2Mnf1g
CV2(a;0)  t1:
For each i 2 f3; : : : ;mg, let Ri 2 RU satisfy the following two conditions:
(i  1) CVi(a;0)
(
< p1 if a = 1;
> t1 otherwise;
(i  2) for each a 2M n fig; CVi(a; (i; pi)) < 0; and
(i  3) CVi(;; (1; 0)) > p1   t1:
Figure 6 illustrates R2 and Ri for i 2 f3; : : : ;mg.
***** FIGURE 6 (R2, and Ri (i 2 f3; : : : ;mg)) ENTERS HERE *****
By n > m, there are at least m + 1 agents. Let Rm+1 2 RU \ RQ be such that for each
a 2 M , v(a) = pa. If there are more than m + 1 agents, then for each i 2 fm + 2; : : : ; ng,
let Ri 2 RU \ RQ be such that for each a 2 M , vi(a) < minb2M;j2f1;:::;m+1gCVj(b;0). Denote
R  (R1; : : : ; Rn). 2
Step 2: For each i 2 fm+ 2; : : : ; ng, Ai(R) = ;.
Suppose by contradiction that for some i 2 fm + 2; : : : ; ng, Ai(R) 6= ;. By Ri 2 RU and
Lemma 3, there is a 2 M such that Ai(R) = a. Since there are only m objects, there is
j 2 f1; : : : ;m+ 1g such that Aj(R) = ;. By Lemma 1, tj(R) = 0.
Let Ai  ; and Aj  a. Then Ai \ Aj = ; and Ai [ Aj  Ai(R) [ Aj(R). Moreover,
CVi(Ai; fi(R)) + CVj(Aj; fj(R))
= CVi(;; fi(R)) + CVj(a;0) (by fj(R) = 0)
= ti(R)  vi(a) + CVj(a;0) (by Ri 2 RQ and Remark 1(ii))
> ti(R)  CVj(a;0) + CVj(a;0) (by vi(a) < CVj(a;0))
= ti(R)
= ti(R) + tj(R): (by tj(R) = 0)
This is a contradiction to Lemma 4. 2
Given i 2 N and R i 2 Rn 1, we dene the option set of agent i for R i by
oi(R i)  fzi 2M R : 9Ri 2 R s.t. fi(Ri; R i) = zig:
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Step 3: Let a 2 M . If a = 1, then (a; ta) 2 o1(R 1) for some ta  p1. If a 6= 1, then
(a; ta) 2 o1(R 1) for some ta  pa.
Let R01 2 RU be such that
(10   1) CV 01(a;0) > max
i2N
CVi(a;0);
(10   2) for each b 2M n fag; CV 01(b;0) < min
i2N
CVi(b;0); and
(10   3) for each b 2M n fag; CV 01(b; (a; pa)) < 0:
Figure 7 illustrates R01.
***** FIGURE 7 (R01) ENTERS HERE *****
By (R01; R 1) 2 (RU)n and Lemma 6, f(R01; R 1) is an MPWE allocation for (R01; R 1).
Let p^  pmin(R01; R 1). By (R01; R 1) 2 (RU)n and Lemma 3, jAi(R01; R 1)j  1 for each i 2 N .
In the following two paragraphs, we show (a; p^a) 2 o1(R 1).
First, suppose A1(R
0
1; R 1) = ;. Then t1(R01; R 1) = 0 by Lemma 1. By A1(R01; R 1) = ;,
there is i 2 N n f1g such that Ai(R01; R 1) = a. Since f(R01; R 1) is an MPWE allocation
for (R01; R 1), ti(R
0
1; R 1) = p^
a. By individual rationality, fi(R
0
1; R 1) Ri 0, and therefore
p^a = ti(R)  CVi(a;0). Since f(R01; R 1) is an MPWE allocation for (R01; R 1), f1(R01; R 1) 2
D(R01; p^). Thus, f1(R
0
1; R 1) R
0
1 fi(R
0
1; R 1) = (a; p^
a). Therefore,
CV 01(a;0) = CV
0
1(a; f1(R
0
1; R 1))  p^a  CVi(a;0):
This is a contradiction to (10   1). Hence, A1(R01; R 1) 6= ;.
Next, suppose A1(R
0
1; R 1) = b for some b 2 M n fag. Since f(R01; R 1) is an MPWE
allocation for (R01; R 1), t1(R
0
1; R 1) = p^
b. By individual rationality, (b; p^b) = f1(R
0
1; R 1) R
0
1
0, and thus, p^b  CV 01(b;0). By n > m, there is i 2 N n f1g such that Ai(R01; R 1) =
;. By Lemma 1, fi(R01; R 1) = 0. Since f(R01; R 1) is an MPWE allocation for (R01; R 1),
fi(R
0
1; R 1) 2 D(Ri; p^). Thus, fi(R01; R 1) Ri f1(R01; R 1) = (b; p^b). Therefore,
CVi(b;0) = CVi(b; fi(R
0
1; R 1)  p^b  CV 01(b;0):
This is a contradiction to (10   2). Thus, A1(R01; R 1) 6= b for each b 2 M n fag. By
A1(R
0
1; R 1) 6= ; and jA1(R01; R 1)j  1, we have A1(R01; R 1) = a. Since f(R01; R 1) is an
MPWE allocation for (R01; R 1), t1(R
0
1; R 1) = p^
a. Hence, (a; p^a) 2 o1(R 1).
Next, we show that p^a  pa if a = 1, and p^a  pa otherwise.
Case 1: a = 1. Let z 2 Z be such that for each i 2 f1; : : : ;mg, zi = (i; pi), and for each
i 2 fm + 1; : : : ; ng, zi = 0. We show that for each i 2 N , if i = 1, z1 2 D(R01; p), and if
i 6= 1, zi 2 D(Ri; p). Then, we conclude that (z; p) is a Walrasian equilibrium for (R01; R 1),
and therefore, by p^ = pmin(R
0
1; R 1), p^
1  p1.
Note that by p 2 Rm++ and Remark 3, if i = 1, then jA1j  1 for each (A1; t1) 2 D(R01; p),
and if i 6= 1, then jAij  1 for each (Ai; ti) 2 D(Ri; p).
Subcase 1-1: i = 1. By (10  3) and p 2 Rm+ , CV 01(b; (1; p1)) < 0  pb for each b 2M n f1g.
Thus, (1; p1) P 01 (b; p
b) for each b 2 M n f1g. Also by (10   3) and desirability of object,
CV 01(;; (1; p1)) < 0, and this implies (1; p1) P 01 0. Thus, z1 = (1; p1) 2 D(R01; p).
11
Subcase 1-2: i 2 f2; : : : ;mg. By (i   2) and p 2 Rm+ , CVi(b; (i; pi)) < 0  pb for each
b 2 M n fig. Thus, (i; pi) Pi (b; pb) for each b 2 M n fig. Also by (i   2) and desirability of
object, CVi(;; (i; pi)) < 0, and this implies (i; pi) Pi 0. Thus, zi = (i; pi) 2 D(Ri; p).
Subcase 1-3: i = m+1. By the def. of Rm+1, for each b 2M , CVm+1(b;0) = vm+1(b) = pb,
and this implies 0 Im+1 (b; p
b). Thus, zm+1 = 0 2 D(Rm+1; p).
Subcase 1-4: i 2 fm + 2; : : : ; ng. For each b 2 M , CVi(b;0) = vi(b) < vm+1(b) < pb, and
this implies 0 Pi (b; p
b). Thus, zi = 0 2 D(Ri;0).
Case 2: a 2 f2 : : : ;mg. Let i = a. Suppose by contradiction that p^a < pa. By (i   2) and
p^ 2 Rm+ , CVi(b; (a; p^a)) < CVi(b; (a; pa)) < 0  p^b for each b 2Mnfag. Thus (a; p^a) Pi (b; p^b) for
each b 2M nfag. Also by (i 2) and desirability of object, CVi(;; (a; p^a)) < CVi(;; (a; pa)) < 0,
and this implies (a; p^a) Pi 0. Note that by n < m and Remark 4 (i), p^ 2 Rm++. Thus
by Remark 3, D(Ri; p^) = f(a; p^a)g. Since f(R01; R 1) is an MPWE allocation for (R01; R 1),
Ai(R
0
1; R 1) = a. This is a contradiction to A1(R
0
1; R 1) = a. 2
Step 4: jA1(R)j > 1.
Suppose by contradiction that jA1(R)j  1. Remember that by Lemma 3, jAi(R)j  1 for
each i 2 f2; : : : ;m + 1g, and that by Step 2, Ai(R) = ; for each i 2 fm + 2; : : : ; ng. Thus,
since there are m objects and they are always assigned by Lemma 2, there is i 2 f2;m + 1g
such that jAi(R)j = 1.
By Step 3, there is t1  p1 such that (1; t1) 2 o1(R 1), and for each a 2 M n f1g, there is
pa  ta such that (a; ta) 2 o1(R 1). By the def. of p, for each a 2 M n f1g, CV1(a; (1; t1)) 
CV1(a; (1; p
1)) < pa  ta, and thus, (1; t1) P1 (a; ta). Therefore, by jA1(R)j  1 and strategy-
proofness, A1(R) = 1.
By A1(R) = 1, there is a 2 M n f1g such that Ai(R) = a. Let A1  f1; ag and Ai  ;.
Then, A1\Ai = ; and A1[Ai  A1(R)[Ai(R). By individual rationality, f1(R) R1 0, and by
Lemma 5, t1(R)  0. Thus, by A1(R) = 1 and the def. of t1, CV1(f1; ag; f1(R))  t1(R)  t1.
Therefore, by A1 = f1; ag and Ai = ;,
CV1(A1; f1(R)) + CVi(Ai; fi(R))  t1 + t1(R) + CVi(;; fi(R)): (1)
We derive a contradiction in each of the following cases since i = 2 or i = m+ 1.
Case 1: i = 2. By individual rationality, f2(R) R2 0, and thus, t2(R)  CV2(a;0). By (2  2)
and Lemma 5, CV2(a; (2; 0)) < 0  t2(R) and thus, CV2(;; f2(R)) > CV2(;; (2; 0)). Therefore,
CV2(;; f2(R))
> max
b2Mnf1g
CV2(b;0)  t1 (by CV2(;; f2(R)) > CV2(;; (2; 0)) and (2  3))
 t2(R)  CV2(a;0) + max
b2Mnf1g
CV2(b;0)  t1 (by t2(R)  CV2(a;0))
 t2(R)  t1: (by a 6= 1) (2)
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Therefore,
CV1(A1; f1(R)) + CV2(A2; f2(R))
 t1 + t1(R) + CV2(;; f2(R)) (by (1))
> t1 + t1(R) + t2(R)  t1 (by (2))
= t1(R) + t2(R):
This is a contradiction to Lemma 4.
Case 2: i = m+ 1. Note that
CV1(A1; f1(R)) + CVm+1(Am+1; fm+1(R))
= t1 + t1(R) + CVm+1(;; fm+1(R)) (by (1))
> t1 + t1(R) + tm+1(R)  vm+1(a) (by Rm+1 2 RQ and Remark 1 (ii))
= t1 + t1(R) + tm+1(R)  pa (by the def. of Rm+1)
> t1(R) + tm+1(R): (by p
a < t1)
This is a contradiction to Lemma 4. 2
Step 5: Completing the proof.
By individual rationality, f1(R) R1 0, and by Lemma 5, t1(R)  0. Therefore, by the def.
of t1, t1(R)  CV1(;; f1(R))  t1. Thus, by desirability of object, for each a 2 A1(R),
t1(R)  CV1(A1(R) n fag; f1(R))  t1(R)  CV1(;; f1(R))  t1: (3)
Since jA1(R)j > 1 by Step 4, we have either A2(R) = ; or Ai(R) = ; for some i 2
f3; : : : ;mg. We derive a contradiction for each case.
Case 1: A2(R) = ;. By Lemma 1, t2(R) = 0. Remember that by Step 2, for each i 2
fm + 2; : : : ; ng, Ai(R) = ;. Thus, we have three subcases: 1 2 A1(R); 1 2 Ai(R) for some
i 2 f3 : : : ;mg; 1 2 Am+1(R).
Subcase 1-1: 1 2 A1(R). Let A1  A1(R) n f1g and A2  1. Then, A1 \ A2 = ; and
A1 [ A2  A1(R) [ A2(R). Moreover,
CV1(A1; f1(R)) + CV2(A2; f2(R))
= CV1(A1(R) n f1g; f1(R)) + CV2(1; f2(R))
 t1(R)  t1 + CV2(1;0) (by (3) and f2(R) = 0)
> t1(R) (by (2  1))
= t1(R) + t2(R): (by t2(R) = 0)
This is a contradiction to Lemma 4.
Subcase 1-2: 1 2 Ai(R) for some i 2 f3; : : : ;mg. By Ri 2 RU and Lemma 3, Ai(R) = 1.
Let A2  1 and Ai  ;. Then, A2 \ Ai = ; and A2 [ Ai  A2(R) [ Ai(R). By Lemma 5,
ti(R)  0. Thus by Ai(R) = 1 and (i   3), CVi(;; fi(R))  CVi(;; (1; 0)) > p1   t1. By
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individual rationality, fi(R) Ri 0, and thus, by (i  1), ti(R)  CVi(1;0) < p1. Therefore,
CV2(A2; f2(R)) + CVi(Ai; fi(R))
= CV2(1;0) + CVi(;; fi(R)) (by f2(R) = 0)
> t1 + p
1   t1 (by (2  1) and CVi(;; fi(R)) > p1   t1)
= p1
> ti(R) (by p
1 > ti(R))
= t2(R) + ti(R): (by t2(R) = 0)
This is a contradiction to Lemma 4.
Subcase 1-3: 1 2 Am+1(R). By Rm+1 2 RU and Lemma 3, Am+1(R) = 1. Let A2  1 and
Am+1  ;. Then, A2 \ Am+1 = ; and A2 [ Am+1  A2(R) [ Am+1(R). Moreover,
CV2(A2; f2(R)) + CVm+1(Am+1; fm+1(R))
= CV2(1;0) + CVm+1(;; fm+1(R)) (by f2(R) = 0)
> t1 + tm+1(R)  vm+1(1) (by (2  1), Rm+1 2 RQ, and Remark 1 (ii))
= t1 + tm+1(R)  p1 (by vm+1(1) = p1)
> t1 + tm+1(R)  t1 (by p1 < t1)
> tm+1(R) (by t1 < t1)
= t2(R) + tm+1(R): (by t2(R) = 0)
This is a contradiction to Lemma 4.
Case 2: Ai(R) = ; for some i 2 f3; : : : ;mg. By jA1(R)j > 1, there is a 2 M n f1g such that
a 2 A1(R). Let A1  A1(R)nfag and Ai = a. Then, A1\Ai = ; and A1[Ai  A1(R)[Ai(R).
Moreover,
CV1(A1; f1(R)) + CVi(Ai; fi(R))
= CV1(A1(R) n fag; f1(R)) + CVi(a;0) (by fi(R) = 0)
> t1(R)  t1 + t1 (by (3) and (i  1))
= t1(R)
= t1(R) + ti(R): (by ti(R) = 0)
This is a contradiction to Lemma 4. 2
5 Concluding remarks
In this article, we considered an object assignment problem with money where each agent can
receive more than one object. We focused on domains that include the single demand domain
and contain some multi demand preferences. We studied allocation rules satisfying eciency,
strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers, and showed that if the
domain includes the single demand domain and contains at least one multi demand preference
relation, and there are more agents than objects, then no rule on the domain satises the four
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properties. As we discussed in Section 1, for the applicability to various important cases, we
investigated the possibility of designing ecient and strategy-proof rules on a domain which
is not the quasi-linear domain or the single demand domain. Our result suggests the diculty
of designing ecient and strategy-proof rules on such a domain. We state two remarks on our
result.
Maximal domain. Some literature on strategy-proofness addresses maximal domains on which
there are rules satisfying desirable properties.16 A domain R is a maximal domain for a list
of property on rules if there is a rule on Rn satisfying the properties, and for each R0 ) R,
no rule on (R0)n satises the properties. Our theorem almost implies that when the number
of agents is greater than that of objects, the single demand domain is a maximal domain for
eciency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers.
However, our theorem does not imply such a maximal domain result in that only multi
demand preferences can be added to the single demand domain to derive the non-existence
of rules satisfying the above properties. For example, consider a preference relation such that
there is k 2 f2; : : : ;mg such that (i) for each (Ai; ti) 2 M with jAij  k, there is a 2 Ai
such that (Ai; ti) Ii (a; ti), and (ii) for each (Ai; ti) 2 M with jAij  k, and each a 2 M n Ai,
(Ai [ fag)Pi (Ai; ti). This preference relation does not satisfy the single demand property nor
the k0 object demand property for any k0 2 f2; : : : ;mg. When such a preference relation
is added to the single demand domain, our theorem does not exclude the possibility that
some rules satisfy the four properties. Hence, it is an open question whether there exist
rules satisfying the four properties when a non-multi demand preference is added to the single
demand domain.
Identical objects. Some literature on object assignment problems also study the case in which
the objects are identical.17 In this paper, we assume that the objects are not identical. And
this assumption plays an important role in our proof. Therefore, our theorem does not exclude
the possibility that when objects are identical, multi demand preferences can be added to the
single demand domain while keeping the existence of rules satisfy the four properties.
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Figure 1: Single demand preference relation.
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Figure 2: 2 objects demand preference relation.
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Figure 3: Multi demand but not k demand preference relation.
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Figure 4: Illustration of proof of Lemma 5.
21
∅
t1
R1
t∗
1
0
(1, p1)
(2, p2)
(3, p3)
3
2
1
R1
Payment
Figure 5: R1 and p.
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Figure 6: R2 and Ri (i 2 f3; : : : ;mg).
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Figure 7: R01.
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